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Abstract
This paper develops a theory of interpersonal status hierarchies that builds on and challenges traditional models of cumulative advantage. Cumulative advantage models predict stability in interpersonal status hierarchies, where status is defined by
asymmetries in social relationships. According to strict cumulative advantage, initial status differences are exaggerated over
time, making upward or downward mobility unlikely. We argue that interpersonal status hierarchies are instead quite fluid,
with individuals regularly moving up or down the hierarchy. Individual status gains do not, however, disrupt the status order as the upwardly mobile are often pulled back to their original positions. This drag of the past generates the same long run
status outcomes as cumulative advantage models, but through very different means: sustained upward mobility is rare because the upwardly mobile fail to maintain their status gains, and not because initial gains are impossible. More generally,
the effect of the past limits sustained mobility in most, but not all, status hierarchies, and we expect sustained mobility where
ties are stable and the expectations for reciprocity are low. We test our model using longitudinal data on adolescents, finding
strong support for the theory. We end the paper with a reflexive discussion about measurement error, hypothesis testing, and
“messy” longitudinal network data.
Keywords: Status, Hierarchy, Mobility, Network dynamics, Adolescent networks

in position to alter the “rules of the game” in their favor, further cementing the advantage of the upper echelon (Bourdieu, 2004). High status actors are especially advantaged when
merit is difficult to distinguish from status, such as in interpersonal status hierarchies. Cumulative advantage generates a
rigid hierarchy in such settings, where mobility is extremely
unlikely, yet enduring in the rare event it does occur.
Here we reverse these propositions, arguing that social mobility in interpersonal hierarchies is actually quite common,
but not often lasting. Moves up or down the status hierarchy
are frequent, but fleeting, as the past strongly drags the mobile back to their original positions. Our model thus arrives
at the same long-term pattern of stratification as the strict cumulative advantage model—where sustained mobility is unlikely—but through very different means. In contrast to cumulative advantage models, which predict growing inequality, or

1. Introduction
How is status mobility possible? Traditional sociological
theories of status (e.g. Berger et al., 1974; Cook and Emerson,
1978; Gould, 2002) generally characterize mobility as the exception to the rule, citing cumulative advantage, or what Merton (1968) famously referred to as the “Matthew Effect”, as the
cause of enduring status inequalities (for a recent example see
Rossman et al., 2010).1 “Strict” cumulative advantage models
can take a variety of functional forms (see DiPrete and Eirich,
2006 for a review) but generally describe the benefits, or returns, to holding a privileged position: where individuals with
initial advantages—whether by virtue of their own talents or
serendipity—garner subsequent advantages, and are thus unlikely to lose status.2 Low status actors, meanwhile, are unlikely to gain it. In some contexts, high status actors are also

1. The Matthew Effect refers to high status individuals receiving more credit or prestige than their accomplishments would otherwise warrant, or
as Merton (1968, p. 58) put it, “accruing greater increments of recognition for particular scientific contributions to scientists of considerable repute
and the withholding of such recognition from scientists who have not yet made their mark.” For empirical examples outside of the scientific domain, Rossman et al. (2010) find that high status film actors are more likely to find subsequent success, and Martin (2009) shows that youth dominance hierarchies quickly become fixed, and that dominant youths are challenged even less often than would be expected.
2. DiPrete and Eirich (2006) show that the “Blau-Duncan” form of cumulative advantage, which attempts to explain group-level inequality through
direct and indirect effects, does not necessarily lead to growing inequality over time—though in practice, most empirical applications seem to find
growing inequality. Because our focus is on individual actors, unless stated otherwise, we focus on “strict” cumulative advantage mechanisms.
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at minimum a stable status ranking, our actors make fleeting
moves up and down the hierarchy before returning to their
original positions. The long-term solidity of most status hierarchies belies, in our view, a great deal of movement between
time points, and is achieved only through the stabilizing influence of the past. Status hierarchies are thus fluid rather than
fixed, but they are also slippery.
Some status hierarchies are less slippery than others, however, providing the upwardly mobile with sufficient traction
to maintain their status gains. Rather than treat sustained mobility as an anomaly, we systematically extend our theory to
the contextual level, explaining why sustained mobility happens in some settings but not in others. We identify two properties of networks that facilitate lasting mobility: sustained
mobility is possible in networks where ties, once made, tend
to endure and where the expectations for reciprocity are low.
In such settings, the upwardly mobile are unfettered from the
past, free to enjoy their newly won status.
We begin the paper by discussing the centrality of cumulative advantage in sociological theory. We then move to our
own theory and explain why status hierarchies are often characterized by movement without sustained mobility. We also
explain why the “drag” of the past is weak, and thus sustained
mobility possible, in some, but not most, contexts. We test our
theory using longitudinal data on adolescents, showing in
multiple contexts that the past matters, dragging aspiring social climbers back to their original positions.
Unlike most studies of network dynamics, we test our theory while recognizing the messy nature of longitudinal network
data. Any study that is dependent on the reporting of particular ties to particular people is subject to sources of measurement error: individuals may report ties inaccurately or inconsistently, making it difficult to distinguish between true change
and change to due error. We develop a simulation procedure
to test the validity of our results. We believe this is a useful exercise. In our case, we can be confident that the results are real,
but this may not be true of all studies, and one can only be sure
by taking the problem of measurement error seriously.
2. Theory
2.1. Status as asymmetry
To describe the process of status change we must first define status. There are many different conceptualizations (see
Martin, 2009 for a review), but most center on the idea that
high status people are socially desirable and receive deference
(Gould, 2002; Martin, 2009 ; Rossman et al., 2010). Gould operationalizes status in network terms, where high status individuals receive many nominations (or “gestures of approval” p.
1147). Research in both the status characteristics/expectations
states (e.g. Cohen and Roper, 1972; Ridgeway, 1978; Ridgeway, 1982) and social network traditions (Bukowski and Newcomb, 1984; Moody, 1999; Moody et al., 2011; Bothner et al.,
2010a; Bothner et al., 2010b) have similarly defined status as
a function of social relationships—higher status actors receive
more friendship nominations (relative to lower status actors),
give advice that is followed, talk more in meetings, and so on.
Asymmetric relationships are particularly useful markers
of status as they imply both social desirability and deference.
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Receiving a nomination without the expectation of reciprocity establishes interpersonal leverage, and we are unlikely to
see asymmetries favor lightly regarded individuals. Higher
status individuals receive many nominations relative to their
outdegree—in other words, ego is high status if the demand
for ego’s time/attention/friendship is much greater than ego’s
rate of reciprocity. Symmetric relationships are of great value
(e.g. because they provide social support, facilitate socialization, etc.), but they establish status distinctions, or signals of
deference, to a lesser extent than asymmetric nominations. An
individual thus moves up the status hierarchy by gaining social leverage, or distinctions, over a large number of people. 3
The questions are how often upwardly mobility happens and
how often the upwardly mobile maintain their status gains.
Below, we contrast our own answers to these questions with
those based on classic cumulative advantage. Though the answers are quite different, the overall outcome—long-term stability of status hierarchies—is often the same.
2.2. Cumulative advantage and its limits
Merton’s (1968) study of scientific careers spurred initial
interest in cumulative advantage processes, where initial advantages—created by talent or chance—lead to subsequent
advantages, thus increasing the gap between the top and the
bottom over time.4 Cumulative advantage ideas were subsequently formalized (Zuckerman and Merton, 1971; Cole and
Cole, 1973; Allison et al., 1982) and applied widely as an explanation for persistent or growing inequality in political, organizational, educational, economic, and even cultural (Salganik et
al., 2006) realms (see DiPrete and Eirich, 2006; Bothner et al.,
2010a; Bothner et al., 2010b).
“Strict” cumulative advantage models assume that future
accumulation depends on the current level of accumulation.5
In the strongest form (for growing inequality), the rate of return itself varies by the level of current accumulation; thus, the
wealthy not only have more money to invest, and thus higher
absolute returns, they also receive better interest rates. In scientific settings, more talented or luckier scientists enjoy ever
increasing advantages over their less talented or unlucky colleagues: even when their contributions are equivalent, they are
evaluated in light of past accomplishments (DiPrete and Eirich,
2006). Strict cumulative advantage also lies at the root of preferential attachment models, where new entries into a network
preferentially choose people with many nominations (Barabási
and Albert, 1999; Newman, 2001; Albert and Barabási, 2002).
Cumulative advantage will operate strongly when projections of future quality or merit are driven by perceptions of current quality – thus scientists with prestigious publications win
grants and websites with many links receive more visibility.
When quality is difficult to discern, observers must rely on current perception as a benchmark, a measure that will disproportionably reward people in advantaged positions. Thus, current
status directly leads to higher future status. Yet even in a more
“objective” world, individuals receive education, training, and
resources based on their past performance. These resources lead
to an increase in productivity, amplifying the initial advantage
in perceived quality (Merton, 1988). These feedback loops make
it possible for small initial differences between individuals to
grow into very large differences in outcomes.

3. Our measure also differs from a patronage based definition, where actors in fragile positions are likely to lose status precipitously if one or more
of their patrons loses status or stops their endorsement (Bothner et al., 2010a and Bothner et al., 2010b). Ours can be viewed as a more “democratic” conception: one cannot achieve high status by receiving many votes from a few people, but must instead receive single vote from a large
number of people.
4. We thus assume that the cumulative advantage process is “positive” so that the parameter describing the relationship between past and current
accumulation is greater than 0. The full range of past events, or “shocks”, thus affects the current level of accumulation. See Footnote 2 in DiPrete
and Eirich (2006) for more details.
5. We ignore, for space considerations, simple cumulative advantage models which specify a time dependence but no explicit relationship between
future and current accumulation.
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Though they are central to many theories of inequality, rigorous longitudinal tests of cumulative advantage are “more
the exception than the rule” (DiPrete and Eirich, 2006, p. 272).
Instead, the mere presence of inequality in the cross section is
sometimes taken as evidence of cumulative advantage, despite
the possibility of alternative explanations, as we outline below.
For example, extremely unequal “superstar” markets are generated when rewards are based on relative, not absolute, performance (Rosen, 1981; Frank and Cook, 1995), but such inequality does not necessarily imply a cumulative advantage process.
Many studies have, however, recognized the subtlety (and
variety) of cumulative advantage mechanisms, noting that
few settings devolve into the winner-take-all monopolies predicted by the simplest version of the theory (Merton, 1968). Instead, factors such as redistributive policies (Merton, 1968), incomplete information (Collins, 2000), normative constraints
(Luhmann, 1987), and the diffusion of status from elites to
their associates (Bothner et al., 2010a; Bothner et al., 2010b) all
prevent winner-take-all outcomes.
In the case of interpersonal status hierarchies, Gould (2002)
offers a clear explanation for the asymptotic growth in inequality, arguing that actors must balance the desire for high status
alters against the desire for reciprocity (Gould, 2002). If people
cared little for reciprocity, they would simply send ties to those
who received the most ties, eventually creating a “star” network, where one actor receives all ties. Thus, for Gould, it is desire for reciprocity alone that prevents the hierarchy from turning into a winner-take-all system of maximum inequality.
In short, constrained cumulative advantage models expect
no winner-take-all systems but still predict growing inequalities and long run stability in the status hierarchy. There is little
room for mobility in such a model unless there are clear measures of exogenous quality distinct from status. The rare upward moves that do occur should be lasting, however, as the
upwardly mobile take advantage of their positions to consolidate their gains.
We argue that a strict cumulative advantage model is a useful, but ultimately incomplete, way to approach status mobility:
incomplete, as the model cannot naturally account for movement in a system; useful, as the basic elements of the model can
be refashioned to explain the causes and consequences of status mobility. We begin by describing the micro dynamics of status change, explaining why there are “Mark Effects”, where initial gains in status are made by previous losers, not winners, of
status contests. We then describe why this initial mobility is often fleeting. We frame our discussion in terms of upward mobility, but we note that any explanation of upward mobility has
reverse implications for downward mobility.
2.3. Mark effects and the drag of the past in the reproduction
of status hierarchies
Individuals in our model often gain and lose status from
period to period (although the moves are generally temporary). Status movement is possible, in part, because tie formation and dissolution are stochastic processes driven by
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multiple considerations, only one of which is status. The desire for novelty, the need for companionship, and the bitterness over past disputes may lead people to make friends with
the ‘wrong’ people and abandon ties to the ‘right’ ones. Thus,
a certain amount of dynamism inheres in interpersonal hierarchies, and some friendship choices may seem illogical from a
status perspective (e.g. befriending an isolate).
Status considerations are, of course, still important for relationship decisions, and we incorporate the two conflicting demands in Gould’s (2002) model into our own explanation of
status mobility: (a) the desire for reciprocity and (b) the desire for high status alters. In Gould’s model, the desire for reciprocity prevents the cumulative advantage process from devolving into a winner-take-all hierarchy. On one extreme, if
the desire for reciprocity greatly outweighs the desire for high
status alters, then ties are likely to be withdrawn if they are
not reciprocated, resulting in less status differentiation and
greater equality.6 In these compressed settings where relatively few ties differentiate the top from the bottom, changes
in ties—which occur for many reasons besides status considerations, including conflict, drifts, changed activities, and new
romances and friendships—have more dramatic effects on status. Status effects could, in contrast, be quite strong. Despite
the drive toward reciprocity (Hallinan, 1978; Lubbers and Snijders, 2007), many adolescent ties are asymmetric. For example, in the widely-used Add Health study, the overall reciprocity rate is just 37% (Ueno, 2005).7 If there is any desire for high
status alters, then they should be more likely than low status
actors to gain and maintain asymmetric ties over time (as they
already receive the esteem of their peers – Gould, 2002).8
The question is whether the reciprocity demands are high
enough to compress the hierarchy and make shifts in the status order possible. There are several reasons to believe that reciprocity demands outweigh the desire for high status alters in
interpersonal status hierarchies; not the least of which is that
many relationships—especially friendship—are premised on
companionship and mutual positive affect. If A tolerates dramatic asymmetry in her personal relationship with B, B is more
likely to carelessly neglect and possibly abuse A’s feelings.
More to the point of status, A’s tolerance signals her lower social rank to others. If, however, A breaks the connection, the social distinction becomes less clear. Furthermore, such breakups are not easy for high status actors to prevent. Since status
is based on positive affect (which cannot be coerced), they have
few enforcement mechanisms at their disposal. These factors
imply a general tendency for unreciprocated ties to be withdrawn or to become mutual, consistent with empirical research
(Doreian et al., 1996; Schaefer et al., 2010).
We thus have a system where higher status actors have a
hard time maintaining their asymmetric nominations. They
have many ties to juggle and reciprocity outweighs the status effects.9 Additionally, if the preference for high status alters is relatively weak, high status actors’ advantage in gaining
new ties will not fully compensate for their losses. Meanwhile,
those with lower status are able to gain new ties, albeit at a
lower rate, without losing many (since they can invest heavily

6. One might argue, akin to the parable about the one-eyed king in the land of the blind, that a network with one asymmetric tie is less equal than
one with many (since in the former, one person will receive 100% of the asymmetric ties). However, we suggest that for inequality to be meaningful, the absolute differences between the highest status person and the lowest must be substantial.
7. Even for “best” friend nominations of the same gender, reciprocity is less than 50% (Strauss and Pollack, 2003). Other studies have found that
between one-fifth and one-third of adolescents have no reciprocated friendships and that the majority of friendship nominations are unreciprocated (Parker and Asher, 1993, Cascairo et al., 1999 and Vitaro et al., 2000). Most rates are, however, subject to fixed degree, potentially leading
to undercounts of reciprocity.
8. Higher status people may also be incapable of fully reciprocating every social offer they receive due to limited time and resources (Mayhew,
1980 and Roberts et al., 2009).
9. This is true even if they have lower probabilities of tie loss. For example, assume an upper status person has 6 nominations and a .2 probability
of losing a given tie over time. Also assume that there is a lower status person with 2 ties and a .3 probability of losing a given tie. Thus the high
status person has an advantage in keeping ties over time. On average, the high status person loses 1.2 ties while the low status person loses .6
ties, meaning the two converge over time despite the advantage of the high status person. The high status person keeps .8 of their ties while the
low status person keeps .7 of their ties over time.
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in their few ties). Thus, rather than adding increasingly more
ties over time, as in preferential attachment models, we expect people with higher status to lose status in subsequent time
points, both in relative and absolute terms. 10
The model does not directly predict the cycles of status
found in adolescent ethnographies (Eder, 1985; Kinney, 1993),
but the loss of status at the top does imply that mobility is possible: the more the status hierarchy is compressed, the more
likely that idiosyncratic changes will alter the status rankings.
The shrinking inequality and status mobility predicted by our
model are difficult to reconcile, however, with the widespread
perception that social status is relatively stable and mobility
the exception (Bukowski and Newcomb, 1984; Eder and Kinney, 1995). We suggest that movements up and down the hierarchy are possible but fleeting as the drag of the past is severe,
effectively moving the mobile back toward their previous position. Those below their long run status position are likely to
enjoy a net gain in ties, while those above it are likely to experience a net loss, producing a general regression toward individual equilibrium points. Our view is therefore similar to
that of Franzoi et al. (1994) who describe status trajectories as
having “movement yet nonmovement” and we find this language and interpretation quite appealing. Substantial individual-level movement (and even types of trajectories, Moody et
al., 2011) is compatible with long-term stability of the status
hierarchy if movers tend to revert to prior positions.
Much of our expectations regarding the past are based on
a simple proposition that new ties are less stable than old ties.
Here, stability refers to the likelihood of an existing tie dissolving, not the likelihood of new ties forming. Intuitively, new
relationships involve a great deal of uncertainty: two people
may become friends without knowing if this is a good pairing.
Empirical research has shown that new ties are less stable than
old, more established relationships (Hallinan and Williams,
1987; Burt, 2000). If new ties are more fragile than old ones,
the upwardly mobile should be more likely to drop in status
in subsequent periods: for their status rests disproportionately
on new ties. By contrast, individuals with stable status, as well
as the downwardly mobile, are more likely to retain status in
subsequent periods (as they rely less on new ties).
The upwardly mobile also lose ties because the expectations of reciprocity are tied up in the certainty of the receiver’s
status: less certainty about the upwardly mobile’s high status
position results in higher expectations of reciprocity and, consequently, less stable nominations. Essentially, if the sender
cannot be sure the receiver is going to remain high status, then
she is less likely to tolerate asymmetry (as asymmetries are not
tolerated from status inferiors or equals). The higher expectations of reciprocity also make it difficult to gain ties. The upwardly mobile face greater demands and must spend more
time and energy maintaining their current relationships.11 This
leaves less time and energy for interacting with new sets of
people, which could, potentially, have led to future nominations. The downwardly mobile will, in contrast, find it easier
to add ties relative to status peers and may regain their lost
position (as they have higher past status and thus lower expectations of reciprocity than status peers).
Our model is thus comprised of two countervailing tendencies. Lower status individuals often gain status in subsequent
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time periods, but find it difficult to maintain their newfound
status, as they gain fewer ties and lose more ties over time. If
the drag of the past (time 1) is strong relative to the effect of
present status (time 2), a past reputation of high status is likely
to cushion, or possibly reverse, the predicted fall of high status actors, while those of lowly origins are likely to fall farther
than their consistently high status peers. A picture of stability
thus emerges in the face of period to period movement, where
the stratification order is maintained and the initially high status win in the long run.
2.4. Contextual variation
We have so far presented a model where initial mobility
is diminished or reversed by the effect of the past, rendering
status gains fleeting and lasting mobility unlikely. Our model
thus arrives at the same long run pattern of inequality as the
strict (constrained) cumulative advantage models, although by
very different means. Unlike cumulative advantage models,
however, we describe how and, more importantly, where, lasting mobility is possible. Specifically, we argue that the effect of
the past, and thus the possibility of lasting mobility, depends
crucially on network stability and reciprocity, the macro realizations of our micro mechanisms (Smith, 2012). We begin
with a discussion of tie stability and then move to reciprocity.
We have argued that upwardly mobile people rely heavily on new ties and that new ties are less stable than more established relationships, making it difficult to maintain status
gains. We suggest, however, that the differences between old
and new ties will be less consequential when ties, in general, are
more stable. The stability of new and old ties should converge
(or be closer) in stable settings as the forces supporting stability make new ties effectively old in a shorter amount of time.12
The upwardly mobile are then more likely to hold on to their
status when ties are more stable: for they are penalized less for
their reliance on newer ties. Formally, we define tie stability as
the proportion of ties (both symmetric and asymmetric) that last
from one period to next. The expected loss in status (T2 to T3)
that follows a status gain (T1 to T2) should decrease as the stability of ties in the network increases (given status at T2).13
Past position is less important in stable settings, but should,
in contrast, matter more in contexts with higher reciprocity. Following Gould (2002), we assume a tradeoff exists between reciprocation and nominating a high status alter. If reciprocity is
expected and not received, the differentials in status between
sender and receiver must be higher to balance the relationship.
Reciprocity here serves as a proxy for the level of asymmetry
tolerated in relationships. The effect of receiver status on asymmetric tie stability and formation is thus larger in higher reciprocity settings (as the level of tolerated asymmetry is lower).
Upwardly mobile people will have a more difficult time maintaining their social rise in higher reciprocity settings. They have
less certain status, and higher reciprocity expectations, than
consistently high status people and status matters more for
keeping and gaining asymmetric nominations.14 Thus past position will matter more where reciprocity rates are higher.
We offer a summary of our main expectations before empirically testing our theory of status change, arguing that:
(a) higher status people have a lower likelihood of losing

10. Of course, it is not possible for the highest status person in a network to gain status in relative terms, and therefore they have nowhere to go but
down. However, cumulative advantage models suggest that such people should continue to make absolute status gains, and so should have an
increasingly easy time maintaining their position at the top. Thus, it is meaningful when they fail to do so.
11. See a similar idea in the work on negative social capital (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993).
12. For example, structured, repetitive interaction may make all ties more stable while simultaneously making new ties old ties faster: the higher rate,
or frequency, of contact means new ties spend less time in the uncertain phase of development, when breaking off the relationship is more likely.
13. This is not tautological since network stability refers to the network average. It is possible for new ties to be less stable than old ones even in
highly stable networks, just as it is possible that new ties will be equally stable as old ties in low tie stability settings.
14. The downwardly mobile will, in contrast, find it easier to regain their lost position: they face lower expectations of reciprocity and there is room
in the hierarchy to move up (as the upwardly mobile are losing status).
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ties and higher likelihood of gaining ties, but that the benefits of status are overwhelmed by the demand for reciprocity;
and (b) for this reason, higher status actors often suffer status
losses, rather than gains; (c) that the higher the gain in status
between T1 and T2, the lower status at T3, given status at T2;
(d), that the underlying mechanisms structuring this drag are
differential tie stability and expectations of reciprocity; and
more specifically, (e), that the past drags more strongly on
current transitions when tie stability is lower and reciprocity is higher.
3. Data and methods
Our longitudinal, multilevel network data come from the
Context of Adolescent Substance Use Study (see Ennett et al.,
2006; Ennett et al., 2008). The study was originally commissioned to study adolescent networks, social context and substance use, although we are primarily interested in the network variables. The survey included three school districts in
North Carolina and began in the spring of 2002. A saturated
sample of students answered surveys every sixth month until the spring of 2004 (for most schools).15 There are 5 waves
of full data but we only make use of the first three to avoid
boundary problems associated with the transition from middle school to high school. The network nominations were restricted to grades while students were in middle school (coinciding with the first three waves of data) but expanded to
the entire school upon entry to high school (waves 4 and 5).
The networks are thus not directly comparable across the
five waves and we use the first three to maintain consistent
boundaries.
The initial cohorts were in sixth, seventh and eighth grade.
The sample includes about an equal number of males and females and an equal number of whites and non-whites (52%
white, 37% black, 4% Hispanic, 7% other). The data are not
representative of the population of adolescents, but the study
has the advantages of being relatively large (N = 4244 in
wave I) and including longitudinal network data over a sizable number of settings and time points. Our dataset includes
24 separate contexts of varying size and network properties,
where each “context” corresponds to a unique grade/school
combination. 16 The average size of the grades/schools is 251,
with a minimum of 44 and a maximum of 511.
4. Measures
4.1. Dependent variable
We construct our status measure from friendship nomination data. Students were asked to nominate up to five friends
from a complete student roster. Using that network information, we measure status as the rate of indegree (or nominations) of an individual, net of their outdegree and the expected
rate of reciprocity in that network. This captures how many
nominations an individual receives conditioned on the number of (expected) reciprocated relationships.
We first estimate a p1 model for each network (Holland and
Leinhardt, 1981). The model predicts a tie as a function of volume (edges), reciprocity (mutuality), and outdegree (sender),
indegree (receiver) effects for each individual. There is one receiver and sender term for each individual in the network. We
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then take the coefficients on the receiver effects as the measure
of status. Formally:

where X is a random network on n nodes; x is the observed
network; θ, β, α, ρ capture effects for edges, out-degree, in-degree and reciprocity respectively; and κ(θ, β, α, ρ) is the normalizing constant.
The basic idea is to estimate indegree conditioned on outdegree, or how often they nominate others, as well as the rate
of reciprocity in the network. Indegree forms the base of the
measure but this is discounted by the expected number of reciprocated ties. Higher status individuals will receive many
nominations relative to the number given out, and are thus
able to form relationships even if they do not reciprocate.
Someone who is nominated 4 times and gives out 1 tie has
higher status than someone who receives 4 nominations and
gives out 3 ties. Someone with 4 nominations and 3 out-going
ties will still have higher status than someone with 0 or 1 nominations and low outdegree (for example).
As an alternative, we could use the simple counts of asymmetric nominations as the measure of status. Here, we would
determine if each nomination per person is asymmetric, where
the focal respondent does not return a received nomination.
We would then sum up the number of asymmetric nominations for every respondent. The results are very similar between the model based and count based measures of status,
but there are substantive reasons to use the model based approach. First, the count approach equates an isolate with no
ties and someone with 5 symmetric nominations and no asymmetric nominations. This is a rather harsh penalty for reciprocation as it affords no status value to symmetric ties. Symmetric ties do, however, serve as a metric of social desirability. We
do not believe that the isolate and the person with 5 symmetric ties should have the same social standing, and the model
based approach explicitly reflects this belief (by giving higher
status to the person with 5 symmetric ties). Second, the model
based approach estimates status scores net of total volume
and reciprocity rates across networks. Thus, the status measures are conditioned on the specific network context. Finally,
the model based approach offers a continuous measure of status, which is more highly differentiated than the simple count
measure (where many people across and within contexts
would have the same status, despite having different profiles
of indegree and outdegree).
4.2. Independent variables
Our main individual level control variables capture signals of attractiveness, or high status, in adolescence. They include GPA, athletic participation, and substance use (Suitor et
al., 2001).17 We use drinking behavior to measure substance use,
where drinking equals 1 if the student has had a drink in the last
3 months and 0 otherwise. We measure GPA, athletic participation and drinking at different waves to see if changes in “quality”, or signals of high status, correspond to changes in status.18
We also include a control variable that measures how important popularity is to each student. People who value popularity, will, following a strategic actor model, do things to gain status. Importance of popularity ranges from 0 to 3, where 0 equals

15. The response rate was 88.4%, 81.3%, 80.9%, 79.1% and 76.0% for the first five waves of the study.
16. We exclude the two smallest schools (around 10 people with full data) and one school where a box of surveys was lost in the second wave. The
school had approximately 35% of the surveys lost and 50% missing data overall.
17. GPA ranges from 1 to 4 where 4 indicates academic success. Athletic participation is an indicator variable, 1 for participates in sports and 0 for
no participation.
18. We measure change in sports participation as a four category factor: “no change-never in sports”, “joined sports”, “dropped sports”, “no changealways in sports”. We use “no change-never in sports” as the comparison group. We have a parallel four category variable for drinking.
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Table 1. Summary statistics.
Variable

Min

Max

Mean

SD

N

Adolescent data: cross section
Status Time 1
Status Time 2
Status Time 3
Status T1–T3
Asymmetric Nominations Time 1
Asymmetric Nominations Time 2
Asymmetric Nominations Time 3
Asymmetric Nominations T1–T3
GPA T1
Sports Participation T1
Black
Hispanic
Other
White
Male
Importance of Popularity T1
Drinking Behavior T1
Number of club affiliations T1

−4.909
−4.437
−4.682
−4.909
.000
.000
.000
.000
1.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

2.705
3.142
2.663
3.142
11.000
14.000
15.000
15.000
4.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
3.000
1.000
5.000

−.334
−.367
−.418
−.373
1.580
1.601
1.527
1.569
2.910
.622
.348
.040
.062
.550
.478
1.784
.127
1.278

1.221
1.173
1.162
1.186
1.692
1.752
1.699
1.715
.795
.485
.476
.195
.242
.497
.500
1.022
.333
1.324

3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834

Adolescent data: longitudinal variables
Number of Ties Lost T2–T3
Number of Ties Added T2–T3
Number of Ties Net T2–T3
Status Change T2 to T3
Status Change T1 to T2
GPA Change T2 to T3
Never in sports T2–T3
Joined Sports T2–T3
Dropped Sports T2–T3
Always in sports T2–T3
Importance of Popularity T2
Number of Affiliation Change 2–3
Never Drinking T2–T3
Start Drinking T2–T3
Stop Drinking T2–T3
Always Drinking T2–T3
Symmetric Ties T2

.000
.000
−8.000
−4.506
−4.386
−3.000
−1.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
−5.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

9.000
9.000
9.000
4.183
4.978
3.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
3.000
5.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

1.420
1.446
−.026
−.033
−.051
−.028
−.085
.288
.056
.141
.515
1.668
−.135
.716
.099
.068
.118

1.409
1.441
1.795
1.198
1.082
.661
.435
.453
.230
.348
.500
1.057
1.225
.451
.298
.251
.322

3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834
3834

Adolescent data: multilevel variables
Log of Size
Tie Stability
Reciprocity

4.159
.306
.249

6.236
.578
.379

5.438
.409
.296

.557
.056
.042

24
24
24

not at all important and 3 equals very important, and should be
positively correlated with changes in status.
We also include a control variable for the number of extracurricular activities (excluding sports) in each wave. Finally,
we include the number of reciprocated nominations as a control variable. Individuals with many symmetric ties are socially active, making it more likely that individuals outside
their social circle will nominate them in the future. The results
are very similar when the number of reciprocated nominations
is not included in the model.
At the network level, we measure the reciprocity rate as the
fraction of non-null dyads (so at least one tie exists between i
and j) which are symmetric (so i nominates j and j nominates
i). We take the average over the three time points as the measure of real interest. Tie stability is measured as the proportion
of nominations, either symmetric or asymmetric, that exist at
time T that still exist at time T + 1. 19 We take the average over
the 3 waves as the measure of interest.
5. Models
We begin the analysis with simple descriptive tables of status mobility over time. This shows how much movement there
is from period to period and how much past position matters for current transitions. We then tease out the underlying

mechanisms underlying these status movements. We predict
the gain and loss of ties at the dyadic level. The models predict
the gain and loss of ties conditioned on whether the tie is reciprocated or not. The question is whether an individual can gain
and maintain ties even though they do not reciprocate. We create a dyadic level dataset and use two multilevel logistic regression models. The first models the probability of a tie remaining at wave 3; the second models the probability of a new tie
forming at wave 3 (the dependent variable equals 1 if a new
tie forms and 0 otherwise). The cases in the first regression are
pairs of adolescents with a tie in period 2. The cases in the second regression are pairs of adolescents without a tie in period 2.
These models have the same basic form as the newly developed STERGMs (Krivitsky and Handcock, 2013), the dynamic
extension of traditional ERG models. STERGMs produce separate estimates for the formation and dissolution of ties, as does
our model. This is analogous to comparing the pseudo-maximum likelihood estimates produced from dyadic independent cross sectional models to ERGM MLE estimates. We opt
for the dynamic dyadic independent models as our theory is
not contingent on higher order dependencies, such as transitivity or other triadic terms, and the coefficients should be estimated sufficiently with these simpler models. Additionally,
the dyadic independent models make it easier to summarize
the coefficients over multiple networks, as the coefficients can

19. The results are quite similar if we define stability by the maintenance of only asymmetric ties. The asymmetric only measure is, however, more
definitionally tied to the dependent variable and thus a less ideal choice.
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be estimated using all networks at once (as opposed to estimating separate models for each and then summarizing the
coefficients afterwards).
For the first set of regressions, we model the probability
of a tie remaining at wave 3 as a function of tie presence in
time 1 and receiver status in time 1 and time 2 (i.e. the status
of the person being nominated). A tie is present if it is asymmetric in time 1 and not present otherwise.20 Individuals with
an asymmetric tie in time 1 should be more likely to maintain a tie currently, given whether they currently reciprocate
or not—as there was asymmetry originally in the relationship.
We also include controls for homophily effects (race, gender,
and GPA), sender status in time 2 and outdegree of sender in
time 2. Formally:

We offer a parallel model for the second set of dyadic regressions, where we model the probability of a new tie forming. The key independent variables are time 1 status and time
2 status for person k, the second person in each dyad, or the
potential receiver of the tie in time 3. Here we test if individuals with higher status in time 1 are more likely to receive new
nominations between time 2 and time 3, given the existence/
non-existence of a reciprocated tie. We include the same controls as above.

Significance test are likely to be generous in dyadic independent models and we perform a permutation test, the Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP), to test the significance
levels of the coefficients (Krackhardt, 1987). QAP compares
the observed coefficients to the coefficients found under simulated datasets, where we randomly permute the rows and columns of each network. We test whether a coefficient is larger
(for positive values) or smaller (for negative values) than coefficients found under random datasets with the same type of
dependence structure. We allow the intercept to vary, making
the model a fixed effects multilevel logistic QAP regression
(see also Martin, 2005).
We then move from the dyadic level to the node level, looking at the aggregation of these dyadic mechanisms. We ask
how individual level status changes from period to period and
how this varies across contexts. We model the change in status
from period 2 to period 3 as a function of status change from
period 1 to period 2. We include second period status, change
in GPA, drinking behavior, number of club affiliations and
athletic participation in subsequent models. We also include
controls for the importance of popularity and the number of
reciprocated ties in time 2. Fixed demographic characteristics
(race, gender) are not included as no change is possible. We
use a linear mixed model as the dependent variable, change
in status, is approximately normal and the data have a nested
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structure. Our final model examines the relative strength of
past status transitions on current transitions. We again predict status change from time 2 to time 3 as a function of status
change from time 1 to time 2, second period status, and the individual level controls. Here, the coefficient on status change
from period 1 to period 2 is allowed to vary across networks.
At the second level (networks), we model the effect of past
transitions as a function of reciprocity and tie stability. Formally, the model may be written as:

where j corresponds to the network.
6. Results
Table 1 presents a snapshot of our key variables. We begin by examining the distribution of status in the cross section.
The mean number of asymmetric nomination varies from 1.6
in time 1 to 1.527 in time 2. Many children have no asymmetric
nominations, ranging from 28% to 30% over the three waves.
Around 15% of the students (this also varies by wave) receive
over 4 asymmetric nominations. The average top person receives approximately 9 nominations but this varies greatly by
context. In some schools the maximum asymmetric indegree is
as high as 15 while in others it is as low as 5. In short, students
unequally receive nominations from their fellow students.
The next question is how strongly the status system is reproduced from period to period. We summarize the level of period
to period movement in Table 2. The mobility tables measure the
proportion of students moving from one status category to another over time. Status is measured in relative terms, capturing the proportion of status inferiors for each student. The status categories range from low to high, defined by intervals of .2.
Individuals make significant period to period shifts in Table 2. For example, approximately 15% of low status students
in time 2 are middle/high status or higher in time 3, while
30% are middle status or higher. Similarly, about 30% of the
high status students in time 2 are middle status or lower in
time 3. And, more generally, low and high status individuals
have about a 50% chance of remaining in their current status
quintile from one period to next. This suggests that individuals have a good chance of being in different status position
over time, although they do not move randomly across the
status hierarchy (confirmed using a simple Chi-square test).
Table 3 offers a more nuanced look at the status movement
across the three time periods. Like in Table 2, the table captures
the probability of moving between status quintiles. Here, however, the transition probabilities between time 2 and time 3 are
conditioned on the time 1 status of the adolescent. Thus, we
ask where individuals move between time 2 and time 3 given
where they started in time 1. If the time 1 position did not matter at all for current transitions, then the sub tables in Table 3
would all be identical and would simply replicate Table 2.

20. The results are quite similar if you define presence by asymmetric and symmetric ties.
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Table 2. Distribution of future status category by current status category.
		

Wave 2 status

		

Low status

Low/Middle

Middle

Middle/High

High status

Total

Wave 1 status

44.9%
24.9%
19.3%
9.2%
2.5%

25.3%
24.9%
22.4%
16.9%
10.2%

15.3%
25.5%
22.8%
21.2%
14.3%

10.6%
16.7%
21.9%
27.4%
23.4%

3.9%
7.9%
13.8%
25.3%
49.6%

100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

		

Low status
Low/Middle
Middle
Middle/High
High status

Wave 3 status

		

Low status

Low/Middle

Middle

Middle/High

Wave 2 status

47.0%
25.7%
17.8%
7.3%
2.5%

27.5%
29.3%
21.2%
15.8%
6.2%

14.7%
23.9%
25.3%
22.7%
12.8%

8.5%
14.7%
23.0%
29.9%
23.7%

Low status
Low/Middle
Middle
Middle/High
High status

High status Total
2.4%
6.4%
12.8%
24.3%
54.8%

100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

Low status, status in lowest 20th percentile in network; Low/Middle, status between 20 and 40 percentiles in network; Middle, status between 40
and 60 percentiles in network; Middle/High, status between 60 and 80 percentiles in network; High Status, status in top 20th percentile in network.

Table 3. Distribution of time 3 status category by time 1 and time 2 status category.
				

Wave 3 status

Low status in time 1		

Low status

Low/Middle

Middle

Middle/High

High status

% of total

Wave 2 status

56.7%
42.3%
37.6%
37.5%
30.0%

25.8%
29.4%
30.9%
26.4%
15.0%

9.6%
15.5%
20.8%
20.8%
25.0%

5.7%
11.9%
8.7%
12.5%
10.0%

2.3%
1.0%
2.0%
2.8%
20.0%

9.0%
5.0%
3.8%
1.8%
.5%

Low status

Low/Middle

Middle

Middle/High

High status

% of total

35.2%
30.4%
21.3%
15.2%
18.5%

32.7%
27.3%
33.9%
30.3%
13.6%

18.6%
24.2%
24.7%
26.5%
29.6%

9.5%
13.4%
14.4%
20.5%
22.2%

4.0%
4.6%		
5.7%		
7.6%		
16.0%		

5.1%
5.0%
4.4%
3.4%
2.1%

Low status
Low/Middle
Middle
Middle/High
High status

		

Wave 3 status

Low/Middle status in time 1
Wave 2 status

Low status
Low/Middle
Middle
Middle/High
High status

		

Wave 3 status

Middle status in time 1		

Low status Low/Middle

Middle

Middle/High

High status

% of total

Wave 2 status

26.4%
18.2%
10.3%
9.2%
14.0%

28.1%
22.7%
28.5%
21.2%
21.1%

13.2%
22.7%
30.9%
27.4%
28.1%

5.8%
8.6%
17.0%
25.3%
23.7%

3.1.%
5.1.%
4.5%
4.2%
2.9%

Low status
Low/Middle
Middle
Middle/High
High status

		

26.4%
27.8%
13.3%
16.9%
13.2%

Wave 3 status

Middle/High status in time 1		

Low status

Low/Middle

Middle

Middle/High

High status

% of total

Wave 2 status

8.3%
8.5%		
10.1%
6.2%		
4.8%		

21.4%
13.8%
14.9%
15.7%
15.6%

26.2%
27.7%
27.4%
19.5%
17.2%

26.2%
28.5%
29.2%
33.8%
29.0%

17.9%
21.5%		
18.5%		
24.8%		
33.3%		

2.1%
3.3%
4.3%
5.4%
4.8%

Low status
Low/Middle
Middle
Middle/High
High status

		

Wave 3 status

High status in time 1		

Low status

Low/Middle

Middle

Middle/High

High status

% of total

Wave 2 status

6.5%
6.5%
1.9%
3.5%
1.3%

9.7%
11.3%
11.2%
7.6%
3.0%

29.0%
17.7%
19.6%
15.7%
7.6%

16.1%
33.9%
28.0%
26.3%
20.0%

38.7%
30.6%
39.3%
47.0%
68.1%

.8%
1.6%
2.7%
5.1%
10.1%

Low status
Low/Middle
Middle
Middle/High
High status

Low status, status in lowest 20th percentile in network; Low/Middle, status between 20 and 40 percentiles in network; Middle, status between 40
and 60 percentiles in network; Middle/High, status between 60 and 80 percentiles in network; High Status, status in top 20th percentile in network.
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Table 4. Multilevel logistic dyadic regression with QAP adjustment: tie kept and gained from time 2 to time 3.
Variables

Tie Kept T2-T3a
Model 1

Tie Gained T2-T3b,c
Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Intercept
−0.601***
−0.705***
−1.291***
−5.031***
Tieji Exists in Time 3
1.881***
1.926***
1.889***
4.708***
Asymmetric Time 1
.640***		
.523***
3.166***		
Time 2 Status of Receiver		
.116***
.136***		
Time 1 Status of Receiver		
.127***
.078***		
Time 2 Status of Sender		
−.051**
−.031		
Match Race			
.235***			
Match Sex			
.556***			
GPA Difference			 −.093			
Out-degree of Sender			 −.044			
N (Dyads)
10,465
10,465
10,465
724,162
Deviance
12,508.938
12,532.240
12,344.779
75,256.573
AIC
12,558.938
12,586.240
12,408.779
75,262.573
BIC
12,740.333
12,782.150
12,640.964
75,297.051

Model 5

Model 6

−5.781***
4.987***
2.454***
.479***
.16***
−.205***
.867***
1.258***
−.236***
.109***
724,162
75,390.044
75,400.044
75,457.508

−7.446***
4.453***
.477***
.078***
−.194***

724,162
68,909.971
68,929.971
69,044.898

p-values are calculated using non-parametric, permutations tests. We randomly permute the rows and columns of each network 1000 times,
randomly attaching the independent variables to the dyads in the school/grade. We then use the randomly permuted data to calculate the
coefficients in Models 1, 2 and 3 for each iteration. The observed coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level if the observed coefficient
is larger (for positive coefficients) or smaller (for negative coefficients) than 95% of the randomly generated coefficients.
a. Models only include cases where a tie existed in time 2.
b. Models only include cases where a tie did not exist in time 2.
c. The “receivers” in these models correspond to the second person, j, in each dyad, or the potential receiver of the tie in time 3.
** p < .01 (one tailed test).
*** p < .001 (one tailed test).

It is clear that initial status matters for current transitions.
For example, we can look at individuals who started at the
bottom of the status hierarchy in time 1 (the top panel in Table
3). They are, across the board, most likely to be in the lowest
status quintile in time 3, despite the time 2 position. Even the
middle/high and high status individuals are most likely to fall
back to their original position. This represents an unlikely trajectory (only 2% of the total population), but it is still the case
that when low status people rise to the top, they have a good
chance of falling back to the bottom.
More generally, those with lower starting status position
in time 1 occupy lower status positions in time 3, given status in time 2. For example, the probability of remaining in the
lowest quintile between time 2 and time 3 goes from .57 to .35
to .26 to .8 to .065 as time 1 status moves from low to high.
Or, from the top of the distribution, those in the top quintile
in time 1 and time 2 have an almost 90% chance of being in the
top two quintiles in time 3, while that number is only 30% for
a strongly upwardly mobile person. This is not to say that time
2 status is unimportant. Those with higher status in time 2 are
the least likely to be in the low status position in time 3, given
time 1 location. The overall picture, however, is still one where
those in the bottom spot in time 1 are likely to be in the bottom
or adjacent status position in time 3, even if they occupy a high
status position in time 2.
Taken together, Table 2 and Table 3 offer a mixed picture of
the status system: there is considerable movement from period
to period but individuals are likely to move back to their original status position after a move up the hierarchy. Much of the
period to period movement is thus individuals losing gained
status or returning to a lost position of the past.
6.1. Underlying mechanisms
We have so far established that there is movement from period to period but little lasting mobility. We now ask why status gains are possible but often met with moves back down
the hierarchy, confirming our underlying propositions: first,

expectations of reciprocity depend on current status; second,
new ties are less stable than old ties; and third, expectations
of reciprocity are dependent on previous status, given current
status. The results of the dyadic logistic regression are presented in Table 4. The first set of regressions predicts which
ties remain from period 2 to period 3. The second set of regressions predicts the formation of new nominations.
We first explain why mobility is possible, focusing on the
time 2 status effects in Model 2 and Model 5 of Table 4. Individuals with higher status in time 2 are more likely to retain
an existing tie, net of reciprocating, but the effect is not overwhelming. For example, in Model 2, the probability of keeping a tie is .38 for someone with 1.5 status in time 2 and .44
for someone with a status value of 4 (an increase of 2 standard
deviations in status, assuming both have 0 status in time 1).
Higher status actors are thus only somewhat advantaged in
keeping ties, leading to a large absolute loss of nominations.
Individuals with higher status are also more likely to gain ties
over time, but this advantage is not enough to outweigh the
loss of asymmetric nominations.
We examine the drag of the past propositions in Model 3
and Model 6. Beginning with tie stability in Model 3, a tie is
more likely to remain from time 2 to time 3, given current reciprocity, if that tie existed and was asymmetric in time 1.21,22
A tie that was asymmetric in time 1 is 1.69 times more likely
to remain (given current reciprocity) than a tie that was not
asymmetric in time 1. Upwardly mobile individuals differentially rely on new ties for their status and thus have a difficult
time retaining their newly found position.
Initial status also plays an important role in structuring the
stability of ties. A tie is more likely to remain if the receiver of
the tie has higher status in time 1. A tie is about 1.9 times more
likely to remain when the receiver is of high status in time 1
(moving from status of 0, the mean, to a status of 4, the maximum). The demands for reciprocity are higher for people with
lower initial status and maintaining asymmetric nominations,
and thus status, is more difficult. The effect is similar for tie
gain: individuals are more likely to offer a new nomination to

21. The results are similar if we include symmetric ties in our measure of time 1 tie existence.
22. The results are given current reciprocity. This implies two possibilities. In both cases, person A likes person B in time 1, but person B does not
return the sentiment. In the first case, person B may start to like person A by time 3, creating a reciprocated tie. In the second case, person B does
not create a reciprocated tie in time 3, despite the initial liking from person A in time 1. In both cases the initial asymmetric tie is more likely to
stay than a tie that did not exist in time 1.
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Table 5. HLM for change in status time 2 to time 3.
Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Intercept

−.066
−.182***
−.423***
−.448
(.037)
(.034)
(.053)
(.295)
Status Change T1–T2
−.355***
−.198***
−.184***
−.199
(.013)
(.014)
(.018)
(.132)
Status T2		
−.337***
−.412***
−.411***
		
(.014)
(.017)
(.012)
GPA Change T2–T3			
.004
.003
			
(.023)
(.023)
Join Sports T2–T3			
−.020
−.021
			
(.069)
(.069)
Drop Sports T2–T3			
−.011
−.012
			
(.048)
(.048)
Always in Sports T1–T3			
.052
.052
			(.036)
(.036)
Importance of Popularity T2			
.013
.014
			(.014)
(.014)
Number of Affiliations Change T2–T3			
.015
.015
			(.012)
(.012)
Start Drinking T2–T3			
.084
.079
			(.051)
(.051)
Stop Drinking T2–T3			
.062
.066
			(.060)
(.060)
Stay Drinking T2–T3			
.040
.042
			(.047)
(.047)
Reciprocated Ties T2			
.116***
.116***
			(.015)
(.015)
Tie Stability				 .337
				(.793)
Status Change × Tie Stability				
.917**
				(.319)
Reciprocity			
−.389
			
(1.019)
Status Change × Reciprocity			
−1.201**
				(.414)
Number of Networks
24
24
24
24
N
3834
3855
3834
3834
Deviance
10,787.995
10,282.742
10,214.726
10,202.689
AIC
10,795.995
10,292.742
10,244.726
10,244.689
BIC
10,821.002
10,324.001
10,338.5
10,375.974
Standard errors in parentheses.
** p < .01 (two tailed test) ; *** p < .001 (two tailed test)

those with higher status in time 1, given reciprocity at time 3.
Individuals with lower status in time 1 have less time/energy
to foster new ties, as they face higher expectations of reciprocity, and are thus less likely to receive new nominations. Overall, the dyadic logistic models show that the past drags on current transitions because new ties are less stable than old ones
and the expectations of reciprocity are higher for initially low
status people.
6.2. Multilevel models of status change
We now place the process of status change into particular contexts, describing how different trajectories of status are
likely/possible across settings. The key is that the micro mechanisms described in Table 4 are amplified or deflated depending on the larger context in which status gains and losses occur, leading to larger or greater drags of the past after initial
status gains (McFarland et al., 2014).
We begin with a simple continuous model of status gain
and loss. Table 5 presents a linear mixed model predicting status change between time 2 and time 3 as a function of previous status change. Status moves between period 1 and period

2 are negatively correlated with status moves between period
2 and period 3. Someone moving up in status is likely to move
back down. Someone moving down in status is likely to move
back up. The negative correlation between previous and current status change holds even if we control for current status
and changes in individual characteristics (see Models 2–4).
Thus, like in Table 3, upward mobility is often fleeting as status gains in the previous period are met with status losses in
the current period (given current status).
Model 4 describes how our micro processes play out in different contexts and how this shapes the potential for sustained
upward mobility. We allow the coefficient on status change between time 1 and time 2 to vary across networks, predicting
the variation as a function of tie stability and reciprocity (at the
network, or second, level).23 As in Models 1–3, status gains between time 1 and time 2 are met with status losses between time
2 and time 3. The strength of this relationship, however, varies
systematically with the level of tie stability and reciprocity. The
drag of the past, or the effect of status transitions between T1
and T2, is lower in schools where ties are more stable. The case
for reciprocity is reversed. The reciprocity interaction coefficients in Table 5 are negative, as expected, and significant. Thus,

23. We ran parallel models where each student was assigned tie stability and reciprocity values purged of individual level effects. We first removed
a student from the network and then recalculated tie stability and reciprocity on the reduced network, assigning those network level measures
to the removed student. This procedure was repeated for each student in the network. In these models, the ties, and therefore status trajectory,
of an individual could not affect their tie stability and reciprocity values. The substantive results for these models are identical to the findings
presented here.
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Table 6. Multilevel logistic dyadic regression, comparing measurement error coefficients to observed coefficients: tie gained from time
2 to time 3.
Variables

95% confidence interval:
measurement error
coefficients

Observed
coefficient

Asymmetric Time 1
Time 2 Status of Receiver
Time 1 Status of Receiver
Time 2 Status of Sender
Match Race
Match Sex
GPA Difference
Out-degree of Sender

(.092, .450)
(−.026, .034)
(−.028, .026)
(−.378, −.355)
(−.048, .034)
(−.055, .040)
(−.086, .112)
(.359, .377)

2.249
.316
.098
−.089
1.017
1.218
−.229
.047

status difference (1), despite having the same status at time 2
(2), while in another setting the status differences would be almost non-existent in time 3, despite having different staring
points in time 1 (2.5 versus 1.5).
In short, mobile students are dragged back toward their initial positions in the low tie stability, high reciprocity setting,
thus reproducing the rank order present at time 1. The past
plays a much less discernible role in the high tie stability setting. The upwardly mobile rely on new, unstable ties and have
higher expectations of reciprocity. They thus have a better
chance of retaining their status when new ties are less unstable
relative to old ties and the expectations of reciprocity are low.27
Figure 1. Change in status between time 2 and 3 by tie stability and
reciprocity.

schools with higher reciprocity have stronger effects of the past,
as the expectations of reciprocity are stronger.24
We present a stylized set of results for tie stability and reciprocity in Figure 1. The lines represent the effect of past status
transitions on current status change in different contexts. We offer four possible settings. The first line represents a low tie stability, high reciprocity network; the second represents a high tie
stability, high reciprocity network; the third is a low tie stability, low reciprocity network; and the last line represents a high
tie stability, low reciprocity network.25 The extreme cases occur
when tie stability and reciprocity differ, as they affect the drag
of the past in the opposite manner. When reciprocity is high
and tie stability is low then the effect of the past is quite strong,
while it is almost non-existent in a system with low reciprocity and high tie stability. A status move of 2 is met with an expected status loss of 1.2 in the low reciprocity, high tie stability setting, but only a loss of .08 in the high reciprocity, low tie
stability network. The effect of the past is somewhere between
these two extremes in networks with similar reciprocity/tie stability values (which is the most likely case as reciprocity and tie
stability tend to be positively correlated).
Or consider two hypothetical cases: person A goes from
1.5 status to 2 between time 1 and time 2 while person B goes
from 2.5 to 2.26 They both have the same status in time 2, but
one is upwardly mobile while the other has recently lost status. The difference in expected status between the two cases in
time 3 is .57 in the high reciprocity, low tie stability setting but
only .04 in the low reciprocity, high tie stability setting. Thus
in one setting, the difference almost returns to the original

7. Testing network hypotheses in the face of measurement
error
Overall, the results are encouraging: our propositions about
status change are supported, as are our contextual level hypotheses. Thus far, we have tested our hypotheses while bypassing
all questions of data quality: we have assumed that adolescents
offer and rescind ties in a systematic manner and that our measure of status change is valid. This follows the majority of network studies. It is possible, however, that these assumptions are
rather generous. The data may be prone to the whims of adolescents, simple errors in reporting, and other unsystematic, random tendencies in the reporting of friendships (as well as incomplete coverage of the network – Smith and Moody, 2013).
It is important to see if our results, which assume the nominations are real, could have resulted from measurement error
in the data. We would not expect all of the data to be false,
of course, but our results could be compromised even if parts
of the data are error filled. For example, we can safely assume that reciprocated relationships are real—as two people
acknowledge the existence of the social tie (for example, i is
about 100 times more likely to form a new tie with j if j already
nominates i). Asymmetric ties are more uncertain. Individuals
may write down the names of their real, reciprocated friends
and then anyone else they can remember on the spot (perhaps
people they saw in the hall or in class). Similarly, people may
circle the wrong name by mistake. It would not be surprising
that such nominations are not reciprocated, as the other person is unlikely to make the same mistake. If this is true, then
asymmetries do not represent differences in status, as we have
assumed, but rather mistakes in the data. We would be unable
to differentiate between true changes and changes due to random error, casting some doubt on the initial results.

24. We would, however, hesitate to push this finding too far as the range of reciprocity across schools is limited, (.249–.379), meaning the inference
is restricted to a small part of the entire range of possible reciprocity values.
25. We define “low” and “high” by the extreme values found in the data (technically a bit above or below the extreme values). Both reciprocity and
tie stability are on the same scale, and we thus use the same low and high values for both tie stability and reciprocity. This ensures that the effects do not seem larger just because the empirical ranges were wider for tie stability. We use .25 as the low value and .5 for the high value for
both reciprocity and tie stability.
26. Assume they both started to drink, were always in sports, had two symmetric ties and valued popularity.
27. We may be concerned that this analysis is misleading if no status gains are possible in stable settings. We suggest that such concerns are misplaced as initial status moves are possible in our high tie stability settings.
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Table 7. HLM for change in status time 2 to time 3, comparing measurement error coefficients to observed coefficients.
Variables

Model 1		

Model 2		

Model 3

95% CI:
Observed
measurement
coefficient
error coefficients		

95% CI:
Observed
measurement
coefficient
error coefficients		

95% CI:
Observed
measurement
coefficient
error coefficients

Intercept
(−.001, .001)
−.066
(−.015, .146)
−.182
Status Change T1–T2
(−.531, −.473)
−.355
(−.300, −.227)
−.198
Status T2			
(−.528, −.445)
−.337
GPA Change T2–T3					
Join Sports T2–T3					
Drop Sports T2–T3					
Always in Sports T1–T3					
Importance of Popularity T2					
Number of Affiliations Change T2–T3					
Start Drinking T2–T3					
Stop Drinking T2–T3					
Stay Drinking T2–T3					
Reciprocated Ties T2					
Tie Stability					
Status Change × Tie Stability					
Reciprocity					
Status Change × Reciprocity					

Given these concerns, we have included an additional analysis checking the validity of the results.28 The test is based on
a simple question: could we have found the same results if all
changes in the nominations were due to measurement error?
We begin by generating networks consistent with this null hypothesis. The networks are constant except for changes due
to measurement error. We begin with the observed networks
in time 1. The reciprocated ties are treated as real. The asymmetric nominations are treated as random guesses on the part
of the respondent. The reciprocated ties are held constant: reciprocated ties present in time 1 are still present in time 2 and
time 3 (so no “real” change occurs). The asymmetric nominations in time 1 are randomly reassigned to other people in the
network. Thus, if person 1 sent out 3 asymmetric ties in time
1, then we randomly select 3 people in the network and assign
nominations from person 1 to those randomly selected people.
We do this for every person in the network who sent asymmetric ties in time 1. These generated networks are then used
to calculate the status scores. This process is repeated three
times to mirror the three waves of empirical data (so three networks are generated, all starting from the time 1 network).
Any changes in status are due to measurement error.
We then rerun the original analysis, using the measurement
error status scores instead of the observed data. The models are
specified as before, except for some small changes to the dyadic models. Here, we only consider changes in the asymmetric
ties, as, by definition, no reciprocated ties are lost or gained over
time. Similarly, we only present the results for gaining ties. Few
asymmetric ties are kept from period to period in the measurement error data, making it impossible to properly estimate the
model for keeping ties.29 For example, in the empirical data 8%
of the asymmetric ties last over the 3 periods, while only .05%
last in the random error data. We repeat the entire process 100
times to capture variation in the measurement error results.
8. Measurement error results
The results, on the whole, are encouraging: the key findings in the paper cannot be generated by measurement error
alone. Table 6 presents the dyadic model results. The table includes the measurement error results as well as the estimates
for the observed data. It is clear that the presence of a tie in
time 1 has a much stronger effect in the observed data than in

(−.015, .146)
(−.502, .053)
(−.556, −.474)
(−.042, .045)
(−.104, .161)
(−.074, .106)
(−.043, .052)
(−.029, .010)
(−.020, .018)
(−.065, .099)
(−.069, .127)
(−.077, .098)
(.068, .101)
(−.576, −.018)
(−.716, .527)
(−.552, .121)
(−1.079, .971)

−.448
−.199
−.411
.003
−.021
−.012
.052
.014
.015
.079
.066
.042
.116
.337
.917
−.389
−1.201

the measurement error data. Similarly, the status effects are essentially non-existent in the measurement error model but are
strong and positive in the observed data.
The contextual level results tell a similar story, where it is
once again clear that the observed results could not have been
generated by random measurement error. Table 7 presents the
multilevel models. Model 1 presents the unconditioned model,
predicting status change between time 2 and time 3 as a function of status change between time 1 and time 2. The first column presents the measurement error results. Those who received new asymmetric ties between time 1 and time 2, and
thus gained status, are unlikely to get lucky again and receive
asymmetric ties in time 3. Thus, by measurement error alone,
those who gain status between time 1 and time 2 tend to lose
status between time 2 and time 3. It is clear that the observed
coefficient is larger (or absolutely smaller) than that generated
by measurement error. This means that individuals who move
up between time 1 and time 2 move down between time 2 and
time 3, but at a slower rate than that expected by measurement
error alone. Some of the gained ties are real and are thus kept
period to period (unlike in the measurement error data).
Model 3 presents the full model. The key coefficients are
the school-level predictors: the interaction between status
change and tie stability and the interaction between status
change and reciprocity. The 95% confidence interval for the interaction between tie stability and status change is (−.716, .527)
in the measurement error model, while the observed value is
.917. Similarly, the confidence interval for the interaction between reciprocity and status change is (−1.079, .971), while the
true value is −1.201. The empirical values are thus well outside
the range expected under random measurement error.
It is important to note that the status change coefficient is
less robust to measurement error in Model 3. The coefficient
captures the baseline effect of previous status change on current status change for a network with low tie stability and low
reciprocity. Here, the empirical value falls within the range
produced by the random measurement error process. The empirical value is −.199, while the 95% CI is (−.502, .053,). This
means that in some networks measurement error can generate
the basic negative correlation between movement in one period and movement in the next; this cannot be the case in most
networks, however, as the overall correlation cannot be generated by measurement error alone (see Model 1).

28. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
29. The data are based on the random assignment of asymmetric ties, and it is unlikely to see a person nominated by the same person twice in a row.
The estimates are very unstable given the small number of ties kept from period to period.
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Table 8. OLS for change in status time 2 to time 3: comparing
measurement error status change coefficients to observed coefficients
in high to low tie stability contexts.
Tie stability of network

95% CI for status change
T1–T2, unconditioned
measurement error model

Observed
coefficient

High (value = .463)
Medium High (value = .436)
Medium (value = .393)
Medium Low (value = .363)
Low (value = .306)

(−.576, −.420)
(−.616, −.392)
(−.682, −.391)
(−.584, −.346)
(−.633, −.367)

−.202
−.286
−.344
−.509
−.682

The values correspond to the coefficient for status change T1–T2. The
models include an intercept but are unconditioned on any other terms. We
do not report the intercept in the table. The models are run on 5 example
networks, running from high to low stability. The models are run separately
for each network.

We explore these contextual differences more directly in
Table 8. Table 8 presents the results for 5 example networks,
running from high to low tie stability. We run separate regression models for each network. Here, there are no contextual
interactions and the model predicts status change between
time 2 and time 3 as a function of status change between time
1 and time 2 (and the intercept, not reported in the table). It is
like Model 1 in Table 7, but there are separate results for each
network. The results mirror those of Table 7. First, the drag of
the past is stronger in low tie stability settings than in high tie
stability settings, and this finding is not replicated in the measurement error results. Second, the observed coefficient on
status change between time 1 and time 2 is outside the measurement error bounds in four out of five cases. It is only in
the medium-low tie stability network that the observed coefficient is consistent with the measurement error results (with
an observed coefficient of −.509 and a measurement error confidence interval of (−.584, −.346)). Thus, most of the networks
have status movement that is inconsistent with measurement
error. We can then be confident in our basic findings.
Overall, the results are real and robust. The dyadic results
clearly show that individuals gain ties in a systematic manner: people give ties to high status actors and do not randomly
pick among the people they see. Measurement error can generate the negative relationship between status change in one
period and status change in the next in a few settings, but not
most. Similarly, our contextual level results could not have
been generated by measurement error. Thus, our basic findings would be the same even if we ignored the few settings
that are indistinguishable from measurement error.
Still, we cannot ignore the fact that status change is indistinguishable from measurement error in some settings. This
does not upset the findings of this paper, but it does offer a
cautionary tale, and we encourage future work to seriously
consider the problem of measurement error in dynamic network data.
9. Discussion and conclusion
This paper has examined the stability of status hierarchies by
building on, and ultimately diverging from, traditional cumulative advantage models. Strict cumulative advantage models
suggest that inequality increases over time, making status rankings stable and mobility unlikely. We argue, in contrast, that
status hierarchies exhibit considerable period to period change.
Higher status people may be socially attractive (Gould, 2002),
but their attractiveness is overwhelmed by the demand for reciprocity, leading many unreciprocated ties to disappear and raising the possibility of upward mobility – as the gap between the
upper and lower strata decreases. The rosy scenario of reduced
status inequality, is, however, spoiled by the drag of the past:
newcomers to the top of the hierarchy often fall farther than
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status peers, while those who had previously lost status are
buoyed by past reputation. Mobile actors are therefore pulled
back to their original position and the status system exhibits
long term stability in the face of period to period movement.
We thus arrive at the same long term pattern of stratification as
cumulative advantage theories, where sustained mobility is unlikely, but from very different paths.
We also diverge from cumulative advantage approaches by
systematically explaining how, and more importantly, where,
sustained mobility is possible. We argue that the upwardly
mobile are more likely to retain their status gains when relationships are durable and reciprocity is not universally demanded. Such settings raise the prospects for lasting mobility. We found, using data on adolescents that our theory was
largely supported.
We have so far developed and tested a theory of status mobility that assumes status is important, but it is worth briefly
considering how status matters. It is clear that status matters
a great deal when it cannot be distinguished from quality: careers, scientific and otherwise, are built on status and reputation. Status is not, however, merely a means to win resources,
but is an end to itself. The majority of adolescents in our
study felt that “being popular” was somewhat or very important, and status valuation predicts subsequent aggression and
other risk behaviors ( Faris and Ennett, 2012; Sijtsema et al.,
2009). Park and Burgess (1921, p. 30; quoted in Bothner et al.,
2010a and Bothner et al., 2010b) observed that “men work for
wages…they will die to preserve their status.”
Given the value that individuals place on status, it is important to consider the role of individual action in status hierarchy dynamics. We have so far treated strategic action, where
actor want status and act to attain it, as a variable to control
away. Valuing popularity and changing ‘quality’ did not predict changes in status, nor did they affect our results. Compared to our model, changes in individual characteristics may
matter more, however, in settings where quality is more easily distinguished from status. For example, a tennis player’s
status within her team may largely be a function of her court
performance. Yet, even here other factors may come into play,
and we might yet expect past interactions to drag on future
status changes.
We have dealt less directly with starker strategic action,
where individuals purposely join or leave settings. It is worth
noting, first and foremost, that many contexts are difficult or
costly to enter or exit (e.g. workplaces) and the desire to move
may be inconsequential. Additionally, actors are unlikely to
change settings based solely on status considerations, and,
even if they do, they are likely to make their entrances blindly,
and to exit only after having failed. The choice to enter or exit
a setting is therefore unlikely to substantially influence our
model. Future work could, however, add to the fullness of our
theory by incorporating self selection into the model.
We also encourage network scholars to address the problem
of measurement error. Longitudinal network data may be prone
to misreporting, making it difficult to differentiate true change
from error. Our simulation offers a simple way to incorporate
measurement error into an analysis, and we look forward to future studies developing more sophisticated approaches.
Our theory also has a number of more specific implications
for ongoing lines of research. For example, social psychological research on task groups (Berger et al., 1974; Berger et al.,
1980; Gibson, 2003) might consider the interaction between sequence, or action order, and context: where initial actions are
more important for long term outcomes in settings where status moves are difficult to maintain. Similarly, status expectations (Berger et al., 1972) will be more consequential, or harder
to overcome, in task groups where the network features make
sustained status movement unlikely.
We also hope that our theory adds to the literature on cumulative advantage processes. DiPrete and Eirich (2006)
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argued that future studies should be more precise in specifying the cumulative advantage mechanisms at work. One
could, in part, answer that call by describing the maintenance
of inequality along the lines presented here. For example,
the literature on cumulative advantage and school tracking
(Kerckhoff, 1993; Kerckhoff and Glennie, 1999) could distinguish between strong cumulative advantage settings and settings where educational gains occur but are hard to maintain,
perhaps as a result of “summer setbacks” (Entwisle and Alexander, 1992). Of course, we may find that cumulative advantage is overwhelmingly strong in other substantive settings:
our argument simply points to the possibility of period to period movement in ultimately stable status hierarchies. The theory thus challenges, however modestly, the monopoly of cumulative advantage, offering a different answer, or perhaps a
different question, to the puzzle of enduring inequality.
Acknowledgments – Data for this research come, in part, from the
Context of Adolescent Substance Use Study, a study made possible
by a grant from the National Institute on Drug Abuse (R01 DA13459).
This project was completed under partial support from NSFHSD:
0624158. The authors would like to thank Diane Felmlee, Robin Gauthier, James Moody, Lynn Smith-Lovin and the network working group
at Duke for helpful comments on earlier drafts. We would also like to
thank an anonymous reviewer who offered supportive, constructive
feedback throughout the review process. Special gratitude is owed to
Susan Ennett for her support of our research.

References
Albert, R., Barabási, A.-L., 2002. Statistical mechanics of complex
networks. Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 47–97.
Allison, P.D., Long, S.J., Krauze, T.K., 1982. Cumulative advantage and inequality in science. Am. Sociol. Rev. 47, 615–625.
Barabási, A.-L., Albert, R., 1999. Emergence of scaling in random
networks. Science 286, 509–512.
Berger, J., Cohen, B.P., Zelditch, M., 1972. Status characteristics
and social interaction. Am. Sociol. Rev. 37, 241–255.
Berger, J., Conner, T.L., Hamit Fisek, M., 1974. Expectation
States Theory: A Theoretical Research Program. Winthrop,
Cambridge.
Berger, J., Rosenholtz, S.J., Zelditch, M., 1980. Status organizing
processes. Annu. Rev. Sociol. 6, 479–508.
Bothner, M., Haynes, R., Lee, W., Smith, E.B., 2010a. When do
Matthew effects occur? J. Math. Sociol. 34, 80–114.
Bothner, M., Smith, E., White, H., 2010b. A model of robust positions in social structure. Am. J. Sociol. 116, 943–992.
Bourdieu, P., 2004. Principles of an economic anthropology. In:
Smelser, N., Swedberg, R. (Eds.), The Handbook of Economic
Sociology. Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton University
Press, New York and Princeton, pp. 75–89.
Bukowski, W.M., Newcomb, A.F., 1984. Stability and determinants of sociometric status and friendship choice – A longitudinal perspective. Dev. Psychol. 20,941–952.
Burt, R.S., 2000. Decay functions. Social Networks 22, 1–28.
Cascairo, T., Carley, K.M., Krackhardt, D., 1999. Positive affectivity and accuracy in social network perception. Motiv. Emotion
23, 285–306.
Cohen, E.G., Roper, S.S., 1972. Modification of interracial interaction disability: An application of status characteristic theory.
Am. Sociol. Rev. 37, 643–657.
Cole, J.R., Cole, S., 1973. Social Stratification in Science. University
of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Collins, R., 2000. Situational stratification: a micro–macro theory
of inequality. Sociol. Theory 18, 17–43.

Smith

and

Faris

in

Social Networks 40 (2015)

Cook, K.S., Emerson, R.M., 1978. Power, equity and commitment
in exchange networks. Am. Sociol. Rev. 43, 721–739.
DiPrete, T.A., Eirich, G.M., 2006. Cumulative advantage as a
mechanism for inequality: A review of theory and evidence.
Annu. Rev. Sociol. 32, 271–297.
Doreian, P., Kapuscinski, R., Krackhardt, D., Szczypula, J., 1996.
A brief history of balance through time. J. Math. Sociol. 21,
113–131.
Eder, D., 1985. The cycle of popularity–interpersonal relations
among female adolescents. Sociol. Educ. 58, 154–165.
Eder, D., Kinney, D.A., 1995. The effect of middle school extracurricular activities on adolescents popularity and peer status.
Youth Soc. 26, 298–324.
Ennett, S.T., Bauman, K.E., Hussong, A., Faris, R., Foshee, V.A.,
Cai, L., 2006. The peer context of adolescent substance use:
findings from social network analysis. J. Res. Adolesc. 16,
159–186.
Ennett, S.T., Faris, R., Hipp, J., Foshee, V.A., Bauman, K.E., Hussong, A., Ca, L., 2008. Peer smoking, other peer attributes, and
adolescent cigarette smoking: a social network analysis. Prev.
Sci. 9, 88–98.
Entwisle, D., Alexander, K., 1992. Summer setback: Race, poverty,
school composition, and mathematics achievement in the first
two years of school. Am. Sociol. Rev. 57 (1), 72–84.
Faris, R., Ennett, S., 2012. Adolescent aggression: the role of peer
group status motives, peer aggression, and group characteristics. Social Networks 34,371–378.
Frank, R.H., Cook, P.J., 1995. The Winner Take All Society: How
More and More Americans Compete for Ever Fewer and Bigger Prizes, Encouraging Economic Waste, Income Inequality,
and an Impoverished Cultural Life. Free Press, New York.
Franzoi, S.L., Davis, M.H., Vasquez-Suson, K.A., 1994. Two social worlds: Social correlates and stability of adolescent status
groups. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 67, 462–473.
Gibson, D.R., 2003. Participation shifts: order and differentiation
in group conversation. Soc. Forces 81, 1335–1380.
Gould, R.V., 2002. The origins of status hierarchies: A formal theory and empirical test. Am. J. Sociol. 107, 1143–1178.
Hallinan, M.T., 1978/1979. The process of friendship formation.
Social Networks 1,193–210.
Hallinan, M.T., Williams, R.A., 1987. The stability of students’ interracial friendships. Am. Sociol. Rev. 52, 653–664.
Holland, P.W., Leinhardt, S., 1981. An exponential family of probability densities for directed graphs. J. Am. Statist. Assoc. 76,
33–51.
Kerckhoff, A.C., 1993. Diverging Pathways: Social Structure and
Career Deflections. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
MA.
Kerckhoff, A.C., Glennie, E., 1999. The Matthew effect in American education. Res. Sociol. Educ. 12, 35–66.
Kinney, D., 1993. From nerds to normals – The recovery of identity among adolescents from middle school to high-school. Sociol. Educ. 66, 21–40.
Krackhardt, D., 1987. QAP partialling as a test of spuriousness. Social Networks 9,171–186.
Krivitsky, P.N., Handcock, M.S., 2013. A separable model for dynamic networks. J. R. Stat. Soc. Ser. B: Stat. Methodol. 76, 29–46.
Lubbers, M.J., Snijders, T.A.B., 2007. A comparison of various approaches to the exponential random graph model: A reanalysis of 102 student networks in school classes. Social Networks
29, 489–507.

Movement

without mobility:

Contextual

limits of cumulative advantage

Luhmann, N., 1987. The evolutionary differentiation between society and interaction. In: Giesen, B., Alexander, J.C., Munch, R.,
Smelser, N.J. (Eds.), The Micro–Macro Link. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, pp. 112–131.

153

Roberts, S.G.B., Dunbar, R.I.M., Pollet, T.V., Kuppens, T., 2009. Exploring variation in active network size: constraints and ego
characteristics. Social Networks 31,138–146.

Martin, J.L., 2005. Is power sexy? Am. J. Sociol. 111, 408–446.

Rosen, S., 1981. The economics of superstars. Am. Econ. Rev. 71,
845–858.

Martin, J.L., 2009. Formation and stabilization of vertical hierarchies among adolescents: Towards a quantitative ethology of
dominance among humans. Soc. Psychol. Q. 72, 241–264.

Rossman, G., Esparza, N., Bonacich, P., 2010. I’d like to thank the
academy, team spillovers, and network centrality. Am. Sociol.
Rev. 75, 31–51.

Mayhew, B.H., 1980. Structuralism versus individualism: Part 1.
Shadow boxing in the dark. Soc. Forces 59.

Salganik, M.J., Dodds, P.S., Watts, D.J., 2006. Experimental study
of inequality and unpredictability in an artificial cultural market. Science 311, 854–856.

McFarland, D.A., Moody, J., Diehl, D., Smith, J.A., Jack Thomas,
R., 2014. Network ecology and adolescent social structure. Am.
Sociol. Rev., http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0003122414554001
Merton, R.K., 1968. Matthew effect in science. Science 159, 56–63.
Merton, R.K., 1988. The Matthew effect in science. II: Cumulative
advantage and the symbolism of intellectual property. Isis 79,
606–623.
Moody, J., 1999. The Structure of Adolescent Social Relations:
Modeling Friendship in Dynamic Social Settings. University of
North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC.
Moody, J., Brynildsen, W.D., Wayne Osgood, D., Feinberg, M.E.,
2011. Popularity trajectories and substance use in early adolescence. Social Networks 33, 101–112.
Newman, M.E.J., 2001. Clustering and preferential attachment in
growing networks. Phys. Rev. E 64, 4.
Park, R., Burgess, E., 1921. Introduction to the Science of Sociology. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Parker, J.G., Asher, S.R., 1993. Friendship and friendship quality
in middle childhood: Links with peer group acceptance and
feelings of loneliness and social dissatisfaction. Dev. Psychol.
29, 611–621.
Portes, A., Sensenbrenner, J., 1993. Embeddedness and immigration: Notes on the social determinants of economic action. Am.
J. Sociol. 98 (6), 1320–1350.
Ridgeway, C.L., 1978. Conformity, group-oriented motivation, and status attainment in small groups. Soc. Psychol. 41,
175–188.
Ridgeway, C.L., 1982. Status in groups: The importance of motivation. Am. Sociol. Rev. 47, 76–88.

Schaefer, D., Light, J.M., Fabes, R.A., Hanish, L.D., Martin, C.L.,
2010. Fundamental principles of network formation among
preschool children. Social Networks 32,61–71.
Sijtsema, J.J., Veenstra, R., Lindenberg, S., Salmivalli, C., 2009. Empirical test of bullies’status goals: Assessing direct goals, aggression, and prestige. Aggress. Behav. 35,57–67.
Smith, J.A., 2012. Macrostructure from microstructure: Generating whole systems from ego networks. Sociol. Methodol. 42,
155–205.
Smith, J.A., Moody, J., 2013. Structural effects of network sampling coverage. I: Nodes missing at random. Social Networks
35, 652–668.
Strauss, R., Pollack, H., 2003. Social marginalization of overweight
children. Arch. Pediatr. Adolesc. Med. 157, 746–752.
Suitor, J.J., Minyard, S.A., Carter, R.S., 2001. ‘Did you see what I
saw?’ Gender differences in perceptions of avenues to prestige
among adolescents. Sociol. Inq. 71,437–454.
Ueno, K., 2005. The effects of friendship networks on adolescent
depressive symptoms. Soc. Sci. Res. 34, 484–510.
Vitaro, F., Brendgen, M., Tremblay, R.E., 2000. Influence of deviant friends on delinquency: Searching for moderator variables.
J. Abnormal Child Psychol. 28,313–325.
Zuckerman, H., Merton, R.K., 1971. Patterns of evaluation in science: Institutionalization, structure and functions of the referee
system. Minerva 9, 66–100.

